A Question of Sovereignty: Tax and the Brexit Referendum by Kendrick, M.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Kendrick, M. ORCID: 0000-0001-7707-0400 (2016). A Question of Sovereignty: 
Tax and the Brexit Referendum. King's Law Journal, 27(3), pp. 366-374. doi: 
10.1080/09615768.2016.1258112 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/23425/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2016.1258112
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
1 
 
A Question of Sovereignty:  
Tax and the Brexit Referendum 
 
 
Maria Kendrick1 
 
 
It isn't right that unelected bureaucrats in Brussels impose taxes on the poorest and elected 
British politicians can do nothing.  
   
Vote Leave2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate about sovereignty in the Brexit referendum campaign was cast in terms of power, 
competence, and ultimately freedom to legislate. The proposition that the UK could take back 
control from the EU was expressly referred to in the context of the principle of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty. Paradoxically, Parliament was purported to require an exercise in direct 
democracy, through the referendum, in order to provide the legitimacy necessary for it to 
reassert its own sovereignty to legislate over maters which fall, or were perceived to fall, within 
the competence of the EU. The question of sovereignty therefore asked which legal order 
should actually be supreme; the national or the supranational. This discussion consequently 
implies issues of territoriality as the ‘boundary line is the line of sovereignty’.3 The 
paradigmatic quality of a sovereign body is the power to tax,4 because it is inextricably linked 
with the power to govern. Consequently, and unsurprisingly, the debate on sovereignty 
included a debate on competence in taxation.  
 
A corollary to the issue of territoriality is the issue of harmonization. The latter denotes an 
eradication of difference between the territories to which it applies and in the context of 
taxation can consequently reduce individual member state control. Therefore, the objections 
voiced in the debate on sovereignty could be construed as objections to harmonization, 
especially on the subject of tax. It is the intention of this article to discuss the constitutional 
theory in the context of tax, and as space precludes a survey of different taxes, this article will 
focus on the classic example of EU tax harmonization, VAT.   
 
However, the constitutional theory cannot be detached from pragmatic considerations, because 
there is no escaping the fact that the debate on sovereignty does not occur in a vacuum. In 
reality, it is the economic expediencies which will be an unavoidable influence on post 
referendum policy decisions. Therefore, it is also the intention of this article to address the 
practical aspects of the referendum in relation to tax, specifically VAT, in addition to the 
constitutional aspects, while reflecting on the questions of sovereignty and flexibility.  
 
 
 
1 Visiting Lecturer in Public Law and PhD Candidate, King’s College London. 
2 Boris Johnson, Michael Gove and Gisela Stuart, ‘EU’LL never believe it’ The Sun, 30 May 2016, quoted in 
‘EU Referendum: Vote Leave wants power to axe fuel VAT’, BBC News, 31 May 2016, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36414761 (accessed 25 September 2016). 
3 Beale, ‘Jurisdiction to Tax’ [1919] 6 (XXXII) Harvard Law Review 587, 588. 
4 Ibid, 588. 
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II. SOVEREIGNTY 
 
The question of sovereignty was prayed in aid by the Leave campaign in the referendum on the 
UK’s membership of the European Union, as the quote at the start of this article indicates. It 
was done in many semantic forms and epithets but few more potent than the slogan to ‘take 
back control’. Of the many connotations to this slogan was the suggestion to take back control 
of all EU legislative influences and reinstate the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
proper.5 Of the many legislative influences rightly, or wrongly, attributed to Brussels during 
the referendum campaign, the reach of EU law as regards fiscal policy was pertinently 
included. It is unsurprising that in the discussion as to which legislative body is sovereign, the 
debate encompassed not just issues of power and competence, but also territoriality. Which 
legal order is ultimately supreme; the national or the supranational? Beale identified that the 
issues of sovereignty and territoriality are inextricably linked to the power to tax, ‘[t]he 
sovereign who has power to tax is that sovereign who by personal ownership of the territory 
has the general control of it.’6 Fiscal sovereignty, as far as the Member States are concerned, 
includes the freedom to design and enforce policies on taxation. This is certainly true for the 
UK and as tax is the traditional province of the State, any intrusion, whether apparent or indeed 
illusory, can be acutely felt: 
 
The power to tax, both as a means of gathering revenue and as an instrument of 
economic management, is one of the most basic and jealously guarded prerogatives of 
the state, and it might be expected that the Member States would be reluctant to allow 
the Community to trespass on their jurisdiction in this area. How a Member State raises 
the money necessary for the functions of its government is, it might be argued, entirely 
its own affair … its system of taxation is no business of other states or of supranational 
organizations.7 
 
This statement could be considered a presentation of the opinions of at least some of the Leave 
campaigners. However, the writers, Paul Farmer and Richard Lyal, continue by describing this 
opinion as ‘wholly untenable’.8 They do so because in a Union, and indeed a globalised world, 
where the intention is to maximise and encourage free trade, a protectionist stance in relation 
to taxation and trade barriers would be illogical. Consequently, what is revealing about the 
roles played by taxation and sovereignty in the referendum are the practical considerations 
surrounding the constitutional theory. The debate on sovereignty does not occur in a vacuum. 
In reality, it is the economic expediencies that will be an unavoidable influence on post 
referendum policy decisions. The attachment between the constitutional theorising on 
sovereignty in relation to taxation, and its practical considerations will now be addressed in 
relation to a concept that relates to the question of sovereignty, but which received 
comparatively fewer references during the referendum campaign; flexibility.  
 
 
5 On the debate regarding the Parliamentary Sovereignty paradox, which saw both politicians and lawyers alike 
cite the preservation of Parliamentary Sovereignty as the reason for supporting Brexit, whilst at the same time 
backing the use of a referendum because of a lack of legitimacy in the Parliamentary system, see the 
Parliamentary debates on the EU Referendum Bill Hansard HC vol 599, col 110 (7 September 2015) and my 
own previous comment on the subject at the time of the Bill’s enactment Maria Kendrick, ‘EU referendums and 
renegotiations’, eutopia law, 15 September 2015 on Matrix Chambers blog, 
https://eutopialaw.com/2015/09/15/eu-referendums-and-renegotiations/ (accessed 25 September 2016). 
6 Beale (n3) 587-8. See also Professor Sir Francis Jacobs, ‘General Editor’s Foreword’ in Paul Farmer and 
Richard Lyal (eds), EC Tax Law (Clarendon Press Oxford, 1994).   
7 Paul Farmer and Richard Lyal (eds), EC Tax Law (Clarendon Press Oxford, 1994) 1. 
8 Ibid, 2. 
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In referring to the concept of flexibility, this article is referring to those arrangements which 
govern the UK’s membership of the European Union and that have made provision for the 
constitutional preferences of the UK. A pertinent example was discussed in the recent House 
of Commons debates on the Finance Bill 2015–16 to 2016-17 in the context of the 5% reduced 
rate of VAT, which applies to a pre-defined list of certain goods and services as a matter of EU 
law.9 It has, for some time, been the desire of a selection of MPs to see the UK provided with 
the flexibility to apply the 5% reduced rate, and the zero% super-reduced rate, to those goods 
and services which the UK Parliament deems appropriate, as and when it deems it appropriate. 
As a sovereign legislature, it can be argued, it is important that Parliament is able to decide the 
rate of tax, even in relation to VAT, which is a tax that not only applies to the EU Member 
States but has also been adopted in other countries around the world.  
 
These varied VAT rates originally stem from ‘transitional’ arrangements which the UK, among 
other Member States, agreed with the EU in the context of harmonization of VAT rates in the 
internal market.10 A form of flexibility arrangement, the UK maintained its selection of reduced 
rates on certain products in the face of a desire by the Commission to achieve complete 
harmonization in the internal market in relation to VAT. However, the Commission has 
subsequently published its ‘Action Plan on VAT’ in April 2016,11 and although space precludes 
a detailed discussion of the proposals contained in the Action Plan, suffice it for present 
purposes to highlight the comment made by the Commission in relation to the continuation of 
the flexibility arrangements of the Member States, including the UK. In its Q&A document, 
the Commission stated its approach, ‘[t]his proposal aims to modernise VAT rates policy and 
give more flexibility to Member States on VAT rates. It is not about scrapping existing reduced 
(or zero) rates.’12 This has not, however, satisfied the Eurosceptic Conservative MPs, some of 
whom remain convinced that the Commission does not intend to provide more flexibility, 
rather ‘the whole thing was steered towards more rigidity, harmonization and uniformity…’.13  
 
On the question as to whether Parliament should just legislate now in the Finance Act 2016 
2015-2016 to 2016-201714, before the invocation of Article 50, to establish its own deadline 
for the removal of VAT on selected products and services, an action presumably premised on 
a reassertion of legislative sovereignty, Jane Ellision MP stated that to do so ‘would impose a 
requirement on the Government to act illegally. We would be in breach of Articles 1 and 110 
of the Principal VAT Directive’.15 It appeared that practical considerations were not far behind 
concerns regarding sovereignty, ‘[w]hatever Members’ views are of what the Directive 
requires … I would be surprised if the Members of Her Majesty’s Official Opposition, or 
indeed any Member of the House, thought we could disregard it at such a crucial juncture, 
 
9 Agreement on legislation to harmonize VAT rates across Member States was reached in June 1991, and 
provided by Directive 92/77/EEC of 19 October 1992. As part of this agreement, Member States have the option 
of applying a reduced rate of a minimum of 5% to certain specified goods, as listed in Annex H of the Directive. 
These provisions are now incorporated in Article 98 and Annex III of what is known as the principal VAT 
Directive, Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of Value Added Tax 
OJ L 347/1, 11 as amended by Council Directive 2009/47/EC of 5 May 2009 amending Directive 2006/112/EC 
as regards reduced rates of value added tax OJ L 116/18. 
10 For more detail on the historic application of VAT rates see HC Library Briefing Paper Number 2683, 20 
May 2016, by Antony Seely. 
11 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/vat/action-plan-vat_en (accessed 29 September 
2016). 
12 European Commission MEMO 16-1024, Action Plan on VAT: Q&A, 7 April 2016 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1024_en.htm (accessed 29 September 2016). 
13 Christopher Chope MP, Hansard HC vol 614, col 165 (5 September 2016). 
14 The Bill received Royal Assent on 15 September 2016. 
15 Jane Ellison MP, Hansard HC vol 614, col 169-70 (5 September 2016). 
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when the disregarding of the Commission’s and other nation’s obligations towards us could be 
significantly against the UK’s national interest’.16    
 
Disquiet and dissatisfaction as to the level of flexibility on offer, or potentially on offer, would 
seem to originate from the aspect of the sovereignty debate that objects to harmonization. For 
many years it has been the EU’s, and specifically the Commission’s, intention to harmonize 
indirect taxes, especially VAT, in order to remove barriers to trade in the internal market. 
However, this has aroused disagreement on the part of Eurosceptics (not just British 
Eurosceptics) who disagree with harmonization as a constitutional concept. A corollary of the 
territoriality argument, the development of policies on the approximation of laws on taxation 
are symptomatic of a loss of control. 
 
However, the desire to assert sovereignty and escape the harmonizing intentions of the Union, 
cannot be detached from practical considerations, particularly in relation to tax and economics. 
It is revealing to observe the post referendum response to tax harmonization. As the new 
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, The Rt Hon David Davis MP, made a 
ministerial statement to the House of Commons on 5 September 2016 on the work of the new 
Department.17 Following this statement, the Minister took questions on the post referendum 
reality, including on the subject of VAT. The Minister’s responses were discussed later that 
day in the House of Commons debates on the Finance Bill 2015–16 to 2016-17, which featured 
a Government tabled amendment18 setting a deadline for a VAT rate reduction as ‘the earliest 
date that may be appointed consistently with the United Kingdom’s EU obligations.’19 Paula 
Sherriff MP pointed out that the meaning of the amendment is that forthcoming Brexit 
negotiations may include an agreement to maintain that VAT rates be set by the European 
Union. She continued by stating that, ‘when I challenged the Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union on that earlier today, he certainly did not rule it out. Instead, he reflected that 
ability to set a zero rate was just one reason why people may have voted to leave, but did not 
actually pledge to deliver it’.20 It therefore appears, in stark contrast to the statement quoted at 
the beginning of this article, that those in favour of the UK leaving the EU for reasons of tax 
sovereignty, would not maintain the vehemence of their criticism of the EU in practice, in light 
of the post referendum economic reality.  
 
III. HARMONIZATION 
 
It has transpired from the discussion above in relation to taxation and sovereignty, that flexible 
arrangements are not necessarily flexible enough for those with a distinct objection to the EU’s 
harmonizing objectives. They are either considered insufficient in terms of retaining Member 
State control over taxation policy, or there is scepticism as to their underlying rationale. 
However, the consequence of the application of practical considerations is that legal 
sovereignty can be limited outside the EU by economic dependency in the post referendum 
reality. Therefore, the constitutional theory behind Brexit, and the practical considerations of 
Brexit, can conflict. This certainly makes the view of the Leave campaign quoted at the 
 
16 Ibid.  
17 A full transcript of the statement can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/exiting-the-
european-union-ministerial-statement-5-september-2016 (accessed 30 September 2016). 
18 The amendment was referred to as amendment number 161 at that time and regarded the lowering of the VAT 
rate on women’s sanitary products to zero%. 
19 Hansard HC vol 614, col 162 onwards (5 September 2016). 
20 Ibid. 
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beginning of this article appear naïve at best. It is therefore necessary to consider the 
interrelationship between harmonization and sovereignty in more detail. 
 
The opinion was expressed at the start of this article that a corollary to the issue of territoriality 
is the issue of harmonization, which denotes an eradication of difference within the territory in 
which it applies and subsequently the loss of individual member state control. This is 
particularly pertinent in relation to taxation. In the famous Marks & Spencer case21 Advocate 
General Maduro opined that legislative harmonization may have the objective of correcting 
market distortions, however, he identified the conflict that may exist ‘between the power 
conferred on the Member States to tax income arising in their territory and the freedom 
conferred on Community nationals’22 (emphasis original) as a result of market harmonization.  
Thus, the issue of territoriality, which is an aspect of sovereignty, ‘gives rise to a tension 
between two opposing systems and to the need to establish an equilibrium in the allocation of 
competences as between the Member States and the Community’.23 It is unfortunate that the 
Leave campaign, in focusing on the ‘boundary line is the line of sovereignty’24 aspect of 
constitutional theory, have risked highlighting rather than reducing this tension with the aim 
not of assisting the achievement of equilibrium but rather of compromising its achievement.  
 
Farmer and Lyal25 suggested, back in the mid-1990s, that both the need and nature of 
harmonization required in the EU is determined by the aims of the then European 
Community.26 However, because the impetus and objective behind harmonization is based on 
economic imperatives, the notions of the control aspect of sovereignty should be viewed in a 
different light. The concept of the single market was not about Brussels controlling all aspects 
of the imposition of taxation on the citizens of the EU in order to render elected national 
politicians helpless, as the quote at the beginning of this article states. EU taxation policy is 
premised on the desire to bring about the elimination of fiscal obstacles in order to enable 
people, goods, services and capital to move freely across political frontiers, for their own 
economic benefit.27 Following the argument of this article, that practical considerations do not 
always complement but rather conflict with constitutional theory, it is unsurprising that one of 
the economic expediencies affecting post Brexit referendum taxation policy decisions is the 
necessity to maintain, or even increase, domestic tax revenues. In fact, this may well be the 
influential factor precipitating what appears to be a change of perspective on the role played 
by elected British politicians in setting rates of taxation in the UK by the Leave campaign. 
Contrary to that campaign’s propoundment, we have seen that there is evidence, in the form of 
a response to a Parliamentary question, that in the face of a potential decrease in revenue the 
EU’s approach to VAT does not look so objectionable.  
 
In actual fact it is ironic to observe that the ultimate outcome of the practical considerations of 
Brexit could be harmonization through the unilateral action of Member States. Professor Rita 
de la Fiera, has suggested that what influences the harmonization of VAT systems across the 
EU is the economic imperative of revenue raising and that this is actually more effective than 
 
21 ECJ, 13 December 2005, Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v David Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of 
Taxes), ECR I-10837. 
22 Opinion of AG Maduro, 7 April 2005, in Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer v David Halsey (Her Majesty’s 
Inspector of Taxes), ECR I-10840. 
23 Ibid, ECR I-10841. 
24 Beale (n3) 588. 
25 Farmer and Lyal (n9). 
26 Farmer and Lyal (n9) 8. 
27 Farmer and Lyal (n9) 8. 
6 
 
the legislative endeavours of the Commission.28 De la Fiera describes the economic imperative, 
‘[r]eviewing the rate structure has been part of every Commission’s attempt to reform the EU 
VAT system—and with good reason. A recent study commissioned by the EU Commission 
indicates that a 50% reduction in the dissimilarity in VAT rates structures between Member 
States could result in a rise of 9.8% in intra-EU trade and an increase in real GDP of 1.1%’.29 
She continues to identify however that, ‘these studies in themselves have traditionally been 
insufficient to convince Member States to act. On the contrary, what has now made many 
Member States act at a domestic level has been the pressing need for extra revenue’.30 The 
statistics are very revealing ‘[s]ince 2009 twenty-five of the thirty-three OECD countries have 
increased their VAT rates, resulting in a broad convergence of VAT standard rates across the 
EU around the 20% mark.’ An unforeseen practical consequence of the sovereignty argument 
which effectively runs counter to the stance of the Leave campaign expressed in the quote at 
the beginning of this article, is that the ‘latest developments raise the possibility that Europe 
might be finally entering a process of convergence of VAT rate structures, not by EU initiative 
but by domestic necessity’.31 
 
Another unforeseen but far more unfortunate consequence of the constitutional theory on 
sovereignty propounded by the Leave campaign is the impact on cross-border trade between 
the UK and the Republic of Ireland. One possible post referendum reality is that a ‘hard border’ 
may be imposed between Northern Ireland, as part of a UK terminating its membership of the 
EU, and the Republic of Ireland, which will remain a Member State. This could potentially 
involve customs border controls. The practical consequence is that either tariff barriers, or more 
likely non-tariff barriers, would follow. It is therefore relevant to briefly consider this feature 
of the cross-border element of taxation in the context of harmonization. 
 
The EU’s perspective on harmonization is that it is necessary in order to allow businesses to 
operate freely, raising capital throughout the Union.32 Harmonization therefore enables 
movement across frontiers. This is as true in relation to the removal of obstacles to trade that 
may result from company taxation as it is in relation to VAT.33 Distortions to cross-border trade 
can therefore occur because of a lack of a harmonized tax base and tax rates, simply as a result 
of an interaction between differing national tax systems.34 Non-tariff barriers in particular, were 
defined broadly by the OECD as: ‘all measures other than tariffs that restrict or otherwise 
distort trade flows.’35 Given the breadth of this definition, it is likely that some forms of non-
tariff barriers would be imposed at the UK border with the Republic of Ireland.36 This is 
 
28 Rita de la Fiera, EU VAT Rate Structure: towards unilateral convergence?, Oxford Centre for Business 
Taxation Working Paper WP13/05, 2013. 
29 Ibid, 18. The Commission Study referred to is: European Commission, A Retrospective Evaluation of 
Elements of the EU VAT System, December 2011. 
30 Rita de la Fiera (n30) 18. 
31 Rita de la Fiera (n30) 1. 
32 Farmer and Lyal (n9) 10. 
33 Space precludes detailed discussion on both the historic and the present EU proposals on harmonization in the 
sphere of company taxation. For further elaboration on this subject see Terra and Wattel, European Tax Law, 
sixth edn (Kluwer Law International, 2012). 
34 Farmer and Lyal (n9) 10. 
35 OECD Trade Policy Studies, Looking beyond tariffs: the role of non-tariff barriers in world trade, 2005, The 
Executive Summary, 11.  
36 On the impact of customs related non-tariff barriers see T. Lyons QC, The Interaction of Customs and Non-
tariff Barriers, in C. Herrmann et al. (eds), European Yearbook of International Economic Law, (Springer, 
2015) 21. 
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especially so should the UK follow a ‘hard Brexit’37 option. In these circumstances it is unlikely 
that the issue will be fully resolved by simply relying on the application of the WTO rules, as 
has been suggested by several well-known Leave campaigners. Although a detailed discussion 
of the WTO rules and the situation of the UK in relation to them, is beyond the scope of this 
article, suffice it for present purposes to say that the WTO itself is not at as far a stage of 
discouraging non-tariff barriers as some may assume. Negotiations on a new Trade Facilitation 
Agreement finally reached a conclusion in December 2013, having commenced as long ago as 
July 2004.38 It was anticipated that improvements to GATT 94, designed to alleviate the 
situation in relation to non-tariff barriers to trade, would be included in section I of the 
Agreement. The Agreement on Trade Facilitation set the deadline of 31 July 2014 for the 
insertion of a Protocol of Amendment in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement. However, a 
consensus on the agreement could not be reached between the members in time and therefore 
a further agreement on an amended protocol text was required but was not reached until 
November 2014.39 As the Agreement only comes into force when two-thirds of WTO members 
have completed their domestic ratification processes, further delays have occurred. At the time 
of writing the number of member signatories is still short of the overall number required.40 
Consequently, it is likely that the UK will need some form of bilateral association agreement 
with the EU that addresses customs tariffs and non-tariff barriers. From a practical perspective, 
this would be in order to avoid less favourable treatment to imports. It is also necessary in order 
to avoid the constitutionally unthinkable consequences for trade and travel over the Northern 
Irish and Republic of Ireland border. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This article started with a quote from the Vote Leave referendum campaign which was 
premised on the Parliamentary Sovereignty paradox. The practical considerations of the 
referendum, as they relate to taxation sovereignty, revealed that the EU does not legislate in a 
vacuum, and neither does the UK. Ultimately, it is becoming clear from the debates thus far 
held in the House of Commons that what happens in practice does not always reflect 
constitutional ideals. It appears conclusive that the reality of post Brexit economic expediencies 
will feature as an unavoidable influence on post referendum policy decisions, with potentially 
unfortunate consequences for the UK’s border with the Republic of Ireland.  
 
Should the UK agree in a Brexit deal with the EU to maintain part of the current economic 
reality, specifically in relation to VAT, this would presumably be in accordance with the 
Commission’s harmonization objective, although not necessarily including flexibility 
arrangements. As a concept which spans both constitutional and practical considerations, tax 
harmonization is ‘a difficult and sensitive process since it does not relate merely to technical 
issues … [but] reflects economic, social and political conditions and budgetary requirements’,41 
which are often conflicting factors which Leave campaigners are realising are not easily 
controlled. The post referendum reality seems set to take a form contrary to the sentiments 
quoted at the beginning of this article. While this may please the present writer, it is a concern 
that the majority of voters look set to be disappointed.     
 
37 A colloquialism referring to the UK exiting the single market completely as a result of the referendum result. 
See further http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-37500140 (accessed 30 September 2016). 
38 See T. Lyons QC (n38) 20. 
39 See T. Lyons QC (n38) 20. 
40 See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/fac_28oct16_e.htm (accessed 28 October 2016). 
41 Farmer and Lyal (n9) 2. 
